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Poland's state sector is far from a write-off. Success stories
amongstate-ownedenterprisesareemerginginallmanufacturing
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showing  up in economywide  statistics  can be regarded  as a
sustainable  trend born  of genuine  microeconomic  adjustment.
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Basing  their report  on repeat visits in late 1992  performance)  and correlate  these with firms
to 75 large state-owned  manufacturing  classified  by 1992  financial  performance.  (By
eiterprises (which  had been earlier  surveyed  in  1992,  presumably,  the transitional  measurement
mid-1991),  Pinto, Belka,  and Krajewski  present  distortions  of 1990  and 1991  had disappeared.)
optimistic  new evidence  about  the transforma-  They show that significant  differences  exist
tion of state-owned  enterprises  in Poland.  between  "successful"  and "unsuccessful"  firms.
Managers  in successful  firms have tended  to
'Ibis evidence  shows  state-owned  entenrmises  stress a change  in product  mix, have  generally
in a much more favorable  light than the  become  more efficient  in the use of materials  and
stereotype  of :,oyopic,  decapitalizing  companies  energy,  have maintained  labor  productivity,  and
that dcminates  discussion  of Polarn's state  have  shown restraint  in setting  wages  and in
manufacturing  sector.  Success  stories  are  borrowing  from banks.
emerging,  and the state sector  is far from a
write-off.  The authors  discuss  key transformation
issues:  the disappearance  of such safety  valves as
Moreover,  favorable  evidence  is drawn from  easy bank loans and interfirm  credit,  hardening
all manufacturing  sectors,  attesting  to the  of the microcconomic  budget  constraint,  excess-
potential  for a diversified  manufacturing  base.  wage tax reform,  and, most importan,
The state-owned  enterprises'  operations  are  managerial  attitudes  and incentives.
largely autonomous,  so the positive  adjustments
indicate  that decentralized  approaches  to  To complete  the picture, they  correlate  the
trnsnformation  could woik  - if bolstered  by  results  of manager  interviews  with the
appropriate  managerial  incendves.  But several  quantitative  performance  of firms. Essentially,
problems  remain, and many  issues  have yet to be  firms  have leamed a good deal about operating
addressed.  in a market economy  in the past three years, and
managers  have matured.  The industrial  revival
Pinto, Belka, and Krajewski  examine  various  showing  up in economywide  statistics  can be
adjustment  indicators  (labor  shedding,  material  regarded  as a sustainable  trend  bon of genuine
and energy  costs, bank borrowings,  and export  microeconomic  adjustment.
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Wage Costs (see note below)
Other
Costs of other income
(+) Balance  of extraordinary  eains and losses
(=)  GROSS  PROFIT (also pre-tax profit or PROFIT  II)
NET OTHER INCOME  =  Other  Income - Costs of other income
UNDERLYING  PROFITABILITY  =  (Sales - cost of sales)/Sales  =  (PROFIT  II - net other  income -
balance  of extraordinary  gains)/Sales
NET PROFIT  =  GROSS PROFIT - income tax - dividends - ppww
DISPOSABLE CASH  =  GROSS PROFIT - income tax - dividends +  depreciation
PPWW = Polish acronym  for excess wages  tax (wages  paid in excess of indexation  norm).
SECTORAL  ABBREVIATIONS:
MET  =  metallurgy
ELEC  =  electromachinery
CHEM  =  chemicals
LIGHT = light manufacturing  (textiles, leather)
FOOD  =  food processing.
NOTE ON WAGE COSTS:  Wage costs  =  basic wage plus payroll taxes and social insurance
contributions.  Calculated as wage bill x 1.65 pre-1992 (20% payroll tax, 45% contributions);  and as
wage bill x 1.2 x 1.45 in 1992 to reflect payment  of social insurance  contributions  on gross wages.I  IN  T  RODUCTION
Nearly three  years  into the  Polish Economic Transformation Program (ETP),  the  state
manufacturing  sector remains vital to fiscal balance  and the restoration  of a healthy banking  sector.  It
also holds the key to growth and the supply response  in view of its unutilized  capacity, export potential
and economic  linkages  typical  to manufacturing.  State-owned  enterprise  (SOE)  behav.or  and reform, the
subject  of this paper, are as relevant today  as in the early stages of the ETP owing to slow privatization
and the continuing  large size of the state sector ir. GDP, exports and taxes. Initial readings  suggest  that
the same is likely to be true of other eiierging riarket economics  owing  to similar starting points. There
is much to be learnt from Poland's experience  as a front-runner.
This paper reports on the second phase of the experience  of 75 large SOEs drawn from five
dlisparate  manufacturing  sectors and scattered  all over Poland. The initial  selection  was non-random,  size
as measured  by 1989 sales being used as the criterion. However,  the fortunes  of the firms have evolved
in random-walk  fashion following  the "big bang" and three years later, the non-randomness  of the initial
selection  seems of limited  relevance. The paper combines  three years of data on the 75 SOEs -6 months
before and 30 months after the "big bang" - with manager interviews  to form a much more positive
picture of SOEs than the stereotype  of a decapitalizing,  myopic  firm, paying  everythiig out in wages and
then approaching  the government  for a bailout.
The focus on large SOEs is valuable because  these still account for a large part of economic
activity.  They also embody many of the more complex  problems in transforming  the r.manufacturing
sector because of their size and bargaining power.  Further, their behavior will not only influence  the
responses  of smaller SOEs but also affect the credibility  of the ETP.  Annex I describes  the sample.
The big bang was accompanied  by an immediate  and sizable  drop in aggregate  industrial  output.
Both 1990 and 1991, when CMFA trade was dismantled,  were years of recession  marked by declining
sales and profitability and rising inventories,  with little apparent adjustment. After the travails of 1990
and 1991, seasonally  adjusted  industrial  output data displayed  an upward trend in 1992  corroboraced  by
surveys of business anticipations, which indicated more optimism among state enterprise managers.
These developments  fuelled the expectation  that the recession  might be at an end, surprising  because: (a)
fundamental  structural reform (privatization  of manufacturing,  banking  sector reform) have yet to take
place; (b) the political system  was marked  by considerable  short-run  instability  following  the fragmenting
effects of the 1991 elections,  culminating  in a change  of government  in mid-1992.
It was decided to re-survey the very same enterprises first visited in mid-1991 to determine
whether  the recovery indicated  by aggregate  data w..- underpinned  by solid microeconomic  adjustment
and to obtain insights into the nature of the revival.
There is little doubt, given its size and potential, that state manufacturing  suitably restructured
and privatized can provide  an important  source of energy  for medium-run  growth. Quantitative  data are
used to  show that there are  emerging success stories among SOEs based on  solid performance.
Qualitative  data based mainly  on structured  interviews  with managers  are used to answer  the central issue
of what SOEs can be reasonably  expected  to deliver and the related incentives  and instruments. What
do managers  expect from the Government  of Poland (GOP)? Are they optimistic? How do they assess
the credihility  of the ETP? What is their response  to excess  wage taxation  and the modifications  proposed2
in the recent SOE Pact?"  What is their perception  of the underlying causes of the 1990  export boom?
Did it signify  genuine  adjustment? How are they coping  with the social assets  (worker housing, vacation
resorts, etc.) problem? What are their attitudes  and incentives?
1.1  Main Results From First Phase (Jan. 1990  - March 1991)
The first phase examined  the microeconomic  reactions  of the sample  firms to the macroeconomic
reforms introduced as part of the "big bang" in January 1990 (Pinto, Belka, Krajewski (1991, 1992)).
It tracked the evolution  of output,  costs and profits and examined  wage setting  behavior, enterprise debt
dynamics and enforcement  of the 'micro" hard budget constraint by banks, made a firm-level  analysis
of the export boom and its causes, and documented  the evolving  tax burden on enterprises. The findings
were based on a direct survey  of the firms covering  the period  June 1989  - March 1991, i.e., six months
prior to and 15 months following  the big bang.  Both quantitative  and qualitative  information  (manager
interviews)  were collected during the enterprise visits.
Some of the main quantitative  conclusions  were: (a) The high nominal interest rate on working
capital (reported by mangers as between 50% and 72% for the month of January 1990  alone) inhibited
borrowing and motivated  firms to pay off zloty  loans, leading  to a squeeze  on working  capital. The huge
decline  in real wages, which were partly compressed  to accommodate  rising financial  and input costs, led
to a demand shock, witnessed by rising finished  goods inventoris.  Firms that could more easily pass
through their costs to their customers  and maintain  their margins  ("low elasticity  of demand")  were more
likely to have maintained  output.  Consequently,  the initial, unexpectedly  large, decline  in output could
be explained  by a combination  of nominal interest rate shock and standard  demand considerations; (b)
high  1990 profits were temporary, stemming from inflationary gains on  oncc-off inventory sales,
devaluation  gains on enterprise dollar accounts  and implicit input subsidies  from CMEA trade; (c) banks
were lax in enforcing creditworthiness,  leading  to an adverse  selection  problem marked by loans going
mainly  to "bad" firms, which was reinforced  by the reluctance  of "good"  firms to borrow; (d) SOEs  tend
to be myopic, with short-run  pressure on wages that works to the detriment  of restructuring  investments
essential for reducing energy and material intensity  and product re-design; (e) nominal and real wages
both displayed remarkable flexibility.  Although significant,  employment  reduction has lagged output
reduction  partly because  partial indexation  of wages  to inflation  enforced  by a punitive  tax, has kept real
wages low; and partly by the natural reluctance  of worker-controlled  SOEs to shed labor.  Therefore,
there is clear possibility of much higher unemployment  once privatization  and commercialization  get
underway on a large scale.  Relatedly,  there are few signs of an emerging  factor market for labor.  An
impediment  is the absence of a housing  market, inhibiting  labor mobility; (f) the hard currency export
boom in 1990 resulted more from slack domestic  demand  than higher export profitability.
The main qualitative  finding  was a definite  attitudinal  shift in favor of profits and marketing in
contrast  to the old, exclusive  emphasis  on production  targets. Further, managers  tended to be the source
of change and innovation,  with workers  playing  more of a reactive, ratifying  role.  However, there was
(and is) a serious  principal-agent  problem,  with managers  serving  at the pleasure  of the Workers' Council
and no obvious owner stressing  long-term  viability  considerations  in decision-making.
"The 'Pact on SOEs", a framework  for enterprise  transformation  was sent by GOP to the main TUs on September  9.  1992
in a consensus  creation  effort. A few details (debt  restructuring)  started  filtering  out by late August. The bulk of the enterprise
visits  took place between  mid-August  and end-September.  Annex  H contains  a brief  description.3
1.2  Conceptual  Framework
The ETP had two major behavioral  implications  for all enterprises, private and state sctior:
(i) trade liberalization  and removal of entry barriers meant an end to pricing behavior  based on
"cost plus constant mark-up  rules.  Prices would be constrained by international  parities and
quality.
(ii) following  the rapid elimination  of manufacturing  subsidies  in the new regime, firms would
be forced to look at profits. marketing  and financial manaegement,  unlike in the old shortage
economy when the production  target was prime.
In addition to market discipline,  SOEs had two constraints  placed on them: (a) a punitive tax on
wages  paid in excess of the indexation  norm (which applied  to the private sector only in 1990); and (b)
the threat of bankruptcy  proceedings  if dividend  payments  were in arrears for more than three months.'
This focus on penalties, rather than positive inducement, flowed from two considerations:  (a) the
stereotypical  image of SOEs as myopic and determined  to decapitalize  the firm through indiscriminate
wage awards; (b) the belief that privatization  would be swift and deal with the horizon problem and
decapitalization.
In reviewing SOE response to the ETP, three points are worth making.  First, the economic
environment  has been such that the short horizon  problem  would apply  equally  to private and state sector
firms - as witness, the natural attraction of the private sector to trading, helping to keep options open.
This absence  of long-term  commitment  could be ascribed  to: high real interest  rates, especially  for export
oriented manufacturing;  high and uncertain inflation; changing tax regime, import tariffs as well as
domestic taxes; fluid legal framework, with property rights not resolved; political fragmentation  and
seeming indecision  on key structural issues, e.g., mass privatization. In addition, the myopia  of SOEs
has been reinforced by absence  of positive incentives  to deal with the transition to privatization  and job
insecurity, which would naturally  lead to an emphasis  on the short-term  and possible decapitalization.
Second, a large part of the deterioration  seen in the state sector would  probably  have taken place
even if all state assets had been instantaneously  transferred to private hands on January 1, 1990:  the
energy price increases  and huge  jump in interest rates combined  with macro stringency  and the intended
deflationary  impact  of the 1990  stabilization  program  would  have exacted  a toll even from a fully private
manufacturing  sector.  Likewise, the CMEA shock, which had a big terms of trade effect and involved
loss of an importan. market would have been difficult  to deal with even by the private sector.
Third, postponing  dealing with incentives  in SOEs means that it is impossible  to separate the
effects of  structural adjustment (decline of  heavy engineering and energy intensive sectors; some
unavoidable  costs of adjustment  in terms of reduced  output and employment)  from distorted incentives.
Below, quantitative  and qualitative  data are used to demonstrate  that remarkable changes are
taking place in SOEs as they continue to adjust to the new market system.
71The  wage norm was  obtained  by fractionally  indexing  wage  increases  to inflation  using  September  1989  as a starting  point.
The dividend  is a tax on capital  assets based  on dte share of the founding  organ  in capital  as of January  1. 1983.4
II  ADJUSTMENT  AND FINANCIAL  PERFORMANCE
A critical question  throughout  the ETP'  -s been  whether  SOEs  would  adjust without  privatization,
and whether macro stringency would suffice to  propel this adjustment.  In empirically assessing
adjustment,  three issues  arise:  (a) How much  time should firms be allowed  to adjust to their radically
new environment?  (b) Can profitability  be used as a measure  of successful  adjustment? (c) What other
criteria should be applied to measure adjustment?
The first phase results covering  January 1990  to March 1991  suggested  that (a) macro stringency,
while necessary, was insufficient  to propel firm-level adjustment; (b) profits would be an extremely
unreliable  measure of adjustment  owing  to their unsustainable  and artificial  nature stenmming  from once-
off inflationary  gains on stocks and hidden subsidies  from CMEA trade; (c) time lapse was insufficient
because  of the sheer magnitude  of the change  from a centrally  plamned  to a market economy  and the size
of the shocks related to the big bang and the collapse of CMEA trade.  In any event, the trend in
underlying  profitabilitv  (a measure  of profits that tried to approximate  profits on the basic business  of the
firm) showed  a steady  decline, dropping  abruptly  in first-quarter 1991  with the collapse of CMEA trade.
Further, apart from impressive  labor shedding, there was little tangible sign of adjustment. But it was
apparent from visits to enterprises  that managers  were keenly  aware of their weaknesses  in marketing  and
fmance and of the magnitude  of the effort it would take to cope with the changes  they faced.
An impressive  aspect of the financial  performance  of firms in this first phase of the study was
the clear link to sectoral origin of the firm.  This was the most important  differentiating factor in
explaining  profitability,  with metallurgical  firms at the top of the heap and light manufacturing  (textiles,
leather) at the bottom, reflecting  the strong influence  of the initial conditions  (dollar accounts, CMEA
trade) that favored heavy industry.  Table 1 shows that profitability has been on a downtrend with an
erratic but growing variance  (measured  by the coefficient  of variation)  within  each sector. This suggests
that profit-making  and loss-making  companies  are emerging in each sector, and that sectoral location is
no longer the key in explaining  financial performance. In fact, it is shown below that good and bad
performers are to be found in all sectors.
In contrast to the negative  stereotyping  of SOEs, this second  phase presents quantitative  evidence
emphasizing  a more positive  side of SOEs. The approach  is to focus  on firms grouped  according  to 1992
profits (which are relatively free of distortions  unlike in 1990  and 1991)  and then gauge whether there
are significant  differences  in adjustment  response  for these groups.  Of course, it is difficult to form a
picture of transformation  possibilities in SOEs based only on quantitative  information. Results from
lengthy  and lively interviews  with managers  are correlated  with the numbers to complete  the picture.  It
will be amply shown first, that there are emerging success stories among SOEs; second that these are
distributed among all  sectors,  implying (a)  that  Poland has  the potential for  a  well-diversified
manufacturing  base, and (b) that picking winners  or favoritism  based on sector would be a mistake.  In
short, the state sector is not a write-off, is far from extinct and SOE managers are capable of good,
market-based  performance.
This possibility  adds a new dimension  to the "privatization  versus restructure  and then privatize"
debate. The focus in Poland  has always  been  on rapid privatization  of manufacturing;  restructuring  SOEs
and clarifying  managerial accountability  and rewards has received little attention. Yet privatization  of
manufacturing  has not taken off for a number  of reasons: size  of the state manufacturing  sector (20-30%
of GDP); absence of quoted shares or other financial instruments/mechanisms  that would not only5
facilitate sale but also solve the information  and valuation  problems  that are bound to plague any large
scale privatization of state assets; limited resources of the private sector to buy up the state sector;
legislative hurdles, especially the clarification of property rights; political obstacles stemming from
perceptions  of the patrimony  being  given away too cheaply. If success stories are emerging  from SOEs,
which are autonomous,  this implies  that: (a) decentralized  approaches  to reforming  and transforming  firmns
can work and are to be favored; (b) MBOs and decentralized  approaches  such as privatization  through
restructuring  should be encouraged. The evidence  given  below will confirm  that this is indeed the case.
Lastly, the evidence  will prove that the upturn in industrial  output in 1992, signalling  an end to
the recession, has solid microeconomic  foundations.
Table 1:  Pre-tax Profit to Sales (%)
FOR THE SIX MONTIS  ENDING
Dec-89  June-90  Dec-90  June-91  Dec-91  June-92
Average  38  23  17  9  -18  -7
Variation  41  52  84  226  277  555
Average  49  27  21  19  -10  -5
ELEC.
Variation  44  44  83  168  279  353
Average  48  30  23  11  0.1  10
CHEM.
Variation  29  47  47  77  38745  114.7
Average  39  17  7  -6  -73  42
LIGHT
Variation  28  74  206  334  100  154
Average  23  18  21  15  10  6
FOOD
Variation  21  34  42  52  87  102
Average  38  26  23  15  10  11
AAA
Variation  42  43  53  56  177  64
Average  34  24  13  10  -8  1.4
A A
Variation  32  37  35  41  192  105
Average  38  19  9  0.7  -57  -33
A
Variation  47  73  157  3832  108  153
Notes:  1. Pre-tax profit is Gross Profit or Profit II.  See Glossary.
2. Variation is standard  deviation  divided by the absolute  value of average profits x 100.
3. For definitions  of AAA, AA and A firms, see text below.
11.1  Financial  Performance  in 1992
How are SOEs performing  in the third year of the ETP? Have they lived up to their stereotype6
of myopic,  decapitalizing  firms? Or are there signs of positive  mnicroeconomic  adjustment  that underpin
the recovery in industrial  output indicated  by economy  wide data? To answer these questions, a simple
classification  of sample firms was developed  based on financial  performance. Using profitability  as an
indicator  of performance  early in the ETP would be flawed  owing to the various temporary factors that
supported the unsustainable paper profits of  1990.  However, by  1992, with the evaporatioii of
inflationary  gains and the implicit subsidies  from CMEA trade, profitable  funancial  performance  can be
reasonably interpreted as a sign of adjustment.  In addition, since Polish SOEs are for all practical
purposes autonomous with little control exercised by the founding organs and ministries, profitable
performance  can also be taken as a sign of good, decentralized  management.
Firms were classified  as follows:
AAA  - positive  net profit in January-June  1992  (the ail-end of the sample  period)
AA  - positive  gross profit in January-June  1992, but negative  net profit
A  - negative  gross profit in January-June  1992.3'
AAA firms could be regarded as having adapted the best, relatively speaking, to market conditions.
Further, since positive  net profit means  that some  profits were retained  in the company,  AAA firms could
be regarded  as responsible  in wage setting, making  appropriate  trade-offs  between  immediate  gain in the
form of higher wages and the long-term  health of the company. Similarly,  AA firms (which pay income
tax, but are unable to meet dividend and PPWW payments)  could be regarded as adapting, but not as
successfully  as AAA firms; while A firms are in questionable  shape, not evcn covering  total costs. 4 '
The results of the classification  were as follows: 31 AAA  firms; 8 AA firms; 25 A firms. Tables
2 to 4 summarizes  the characteristics  of these groups.
Table 2: Characteristics  of AAA Firms
1.  Sectoral  Origin:  Met  - 5, Elec  - 5, Chem  - 10, Light  - 3, Food  - 8.  Total:  I1.
2.  Main Products:  Processed  ferrous and non-ferrous  products; refrigerators, ovens; heavy
engines; transformers;  wires and cables; paints and varnishes;  tires;
fertilizer; floor tiles; finished  garments; cigarettes; sweets and
chocolates;  processed  meat.
3.  Organization:  2 privatized, 10 commercialized,  19 state-owned
4.  Size:  Avg. 1991  Sales = $103 million; Avg. empl. June 92 = 2939
3/Net  profit is retained  earnings  after paying  coqporate  income  tax, the dividend  and excess  wage  tax (PPWW). Gross profit
is pre-tax  profit. See Glossary  for complete  definitions  of these terms,  which  conform  to Polish  accounting  conventions.
4'Quantitative  evidence  on adjustment  is provided  below. lhe  tempadon to interpret.  A firms  as useless  or unviable  should
be resisted,  as such firms may well, with debt restructuring  and better managerial  incentives  (or privatization)  have long-term
potemW.7
Table 3: Characteristics  of AA Finns
1. Sectoral  Origin:  Mlet  - 4, Chem - 1, Food - 3. Total: 8.
2. Main Products:  Raw and semi-processed  steel products, steel pipes, fertilizers, meat
products, sugar.
3. Organiz-ation:  2 commercialized,  6 state owned.
4. Size:  Avg. 1991  Sales = $99 million; Avg. empl. June 92  =  2890
Tab!e 4: Characteristics  of A FiiLns
1. Sectoral Origin:  Met - 4, Elec - 5, Chem -2, Light - 12,  Food - 2. Total: 25
2. Main Products:  Semi-finished  steel products, raw steel, processed steel products -small
amount, means  of passenger  road transportation,  trailers, machine  tools,
construction  equipment,  man made fibers, plastics, hosiery, shoes, textiles,
threads, woolen threads, sugar.
3. Organization:  1 privatized, 11 commercialized,  13 state owned.
4. Size:  Avg. 1991 Sales = $55 million; Avg. empl. June 92 = 3300.
An important  feature of the AAA firms is that they defy any simple classification:  these finns
include consumer and producer goods companies; heavy and light industry; those that were heavily
affected  by the collapse  of the CMEA and those that were not; exporters  to the west and predominantly
domestic sellers.  Sectoral nfigin, which was the dominant  explanatory  factor of profit performance  in
the early part of the ETP is irrelevant today.  Notably, the A firms are dominated by the light
manufacturing  sector (shoes, textiles), with roughly  half the firms. Once again, a broad cross-section  of
products is represented;  but these  firms have significantly  higher  employment  than AAA or AA firms and
much lower sales.  The A firms are not necessarily  without  good prospects. This could depend upon
suitable financial, labor and other restructuring,  as the findings  below will indicate.
AAA  firms come from all sectors  and produce  a variety of goods. Regarding  organization,  2 are
privatized (by a foreign strategic investor acquiring a majority stake), 10 are 100% Treasury-owned
companies  ("commercialized")  and 19 are state-owned. The material  distinction  is that commercialized
companies do  not have Workers' Councils and are controlled by  the manager, who reports to  a
Supenrisory  Board usually consisting  of 4 members nominated  by the Ministry of Privatization and 2
drawn internally. SOEs are controlled  by Workers' Councils,  which play an important  role in clearing
all strategic and even opera.ional  decisions  in the firm.  It is difficult  to make a clear link between  form
of organization  and performance  (a bias arises if the best firms are chosen for commercialization;  the time
lapse is inadequate  to conclude  that one form is decidedly  superior to the other). In fact, there are more
SOEs than commercialized  firms among AAA, and roughly the same number among  A.  But managers
expressed a distinct preference  for commercialization,  discussed  later.
The lower panel of Table 1 shows the profit performance  of the three groups.  All are on a
downward  trend, although this is arrested for AAA and AA firms in 1992, with AAA firms somewhat8
more consistent.
Key facets of adjustment  are now correlated  with the firm groupings  AAA, AA, A.  Owing to
the small number of AA firms, the comparison  will focus on the two ex.remes, AAA and A.
11.2  Labor Adjustment:  Real Sales. Productivity  and Unit Labor Cost
The "big bang" was accompanied  by an immediate  and sharp drop in industrial  output  measured
by real sales.  This was an economy-wide  phenomenon,  resulting  eventually  in a 12% decline in GDP
in 1990.  But the drop in output was not matched  by labor shedding, leading to declining productivity
and eventually, rising unit labor cost.
Results in the sample followed this general pattern.  However, employment reduction has
continued while sales have gradually stabilized. Figure 1 plots real sales for selected months for the
AAA, AA and A firms, using September 1989  as the base.  For AAA firms, real sales hit rock bottom
in mid-91 and have been on arn  uptrend since. AA firms show recovery in 1992; but A firms are on a
downtrend throughout. The difference  shows up in productivity,  shown in Figure 2.  Comparing  June
1992 and September  1989, AAA firms almost maintained  productivity  levels (-3%), while these  fell for
AA firms (-15%) and dropped drastically  for A firms (40%).  Not surprisingly, efficiency  measured  by
unit labor cost shows that AAA firms were far ahead of A firms.
Figure 3 plots the trend in unit labor cost.  The year 1989  was marked by sharply rising wages,
with an acceleration  in the last quarter. The big bang of January 1, 1990  was marked by a huge increase
in materials  and energy  prices and a more than three-fold  increase  in interest rates, which exceeded  50%
for the month  of January alone. Firms froze nominal  wages  as a shock absorber, leading  to a sharp drop
in unit labor costs.  However, as fears of bankruptcy receded, real wages and unit labor costs grew
rapidly, a trend that persisted until the end of 1990.  Subsequently,  the trend has been downward,
indicating  that all finrns  in the sample  are taking  measures  to control  labor  costs, including  wage restraint,
labor shedding and maintaining  output; but in comparing  the two extremes, the performance  of AAA
firms is decidedly  superior to that of A firms.
Table 5 shows substantial  labor shedding, in spite of Workers' Councils. For the total sample,
labor was reduced by a remarkable  27%, with the labor-intensive  A group leading the way.  However,
this group has also been plagued  with the biggest  marketing  problems, leading  to falling productivity.
Table 5:  Index of Employment  (September 1989=  100)
|  Dec-89  |  June-90  Dec-90  |  June-91  Dec-91  |June-92  j
AAA  101.7  95.1  93.4  87.4  84.4  79.4
AA  99.7  98.7  95.2  87.3  78.5  76.5
A  100.1  95.9  88.5  81.9  74.0  67.1
ITotal  100.8  95.8  91.3  84.7  78.8  73.29
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II.3  Materials and Energy Costs
Table 6 contains  the ratio of materials and energy costs to sales for selected  periods.  In 1990,
all three groups were level. The dollarizing  of CMEA  prices and the removal  of related  implicit  subsidies
shows up in the numbers for the first six months  of 1991; but a downward  course was then set in motion
proving that the efficiency  of materials  and energy consumption  is on the rise.  It is remarkable  that A
firms exhibit this increased efficiency  as well.  This leads to the conclusion  that a key problem for A
firms is low capacity  utilization,  shown  by the sharp compression  of real sales, with a continuing  decline
in 1992  (Figure 1).  As the analysis  showed,  moreover, these firms have a larger labor stock on average
and are plagued with inefficient  labor usage despite much greater labor shedding  (Table 5).
Table 6: Materials and Energy Costs to Sales (%)
1990  1991  1991  1992
__________________  ___________________  (1.6)  (1-12)  (1-6)
AAA  52  58  50  45
|AA  47  60  61  50l
A  48  47  45  39
11.4  Budget Constraint: Bank Loans. Interfirm Credit and Tax Arrears
A general perception  during 1990  and early 1991 was that the discipline  of macro stringency
was being diluted by bank loans, interfirm  credit and the accumulation  of tax arrears.  In short, the
firm-level  budget constraint  was not yet hard.  This section reviews the relevant  quantitative  evidence
from the sample, using the new classification  of firms, AAA, AA and A.  It concludes  that the firm-
level budget constraint, while lax through 1991, is now marked by substantial  tightening  of bank
loans, levelling  off of net interfirm lending  by AAA firms, but considerable  laxity in tax payments.
Preceding  results showed  that A firms lagged behind  significantly  in maintaining  sales.  As
depicted in Figure 4, inventories  of finished  goods (finished  goods  to sales %) rose rapidly for these
fairms,  then stabilized  at a high plateau. This is in sharp contrast to AAA firms, where inventories
initially  jumped up in January 1990  from the low, shortage  economy  levels, reached a peak in
December 1991 and then declined. A similar pattern obLains  for AA firms, although  the decline in
1992 was much sharper.  If the inventory  accumulation  of A firms was financed  by working capital
loans or inter firm borrowing, this would indicate  softness  in the budget constraint.
Figure 5 plots the path of nominal  working  capital loans from banks for the three groups of
firms.  Comparing AAA and A firms, January 1990  was marked by a modest  nominal increase  in
loans despite 110% PPI inflation. Between  January and March 1990, there was a rapid increase in
loans to AAA firns,  coinciding  with lower interest rates; but A firms increased borrowing  much less.
Thereafter, the pattern is drastically  different. In the 21 months March 1990 - December 1991, loans
to A firms rose by 214% compared  to 92% for AAA firms.  This period coincided  with the rapid
accumulation  of finished goods  stocks by A firms noted above.11
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Table  7 shows  tbat  this more  than  doubled  for A film  between  March  1990  and December  1991t12
with almost no change for AAA firms.  This supports  the inference  that the big increase in working
capital loans to A firms did not support a higher level of activity, but was a result of rolling over
interest payments as they fell due, and financing  growing stocks.
Figure 6 shows the time path
of investment  loans from banks. AA
firms exhibit a jump in borrowing  for  Nominal Investnent  Loans
investments  at the start of the ETP  (Dec.  1989 =  100)
and then stagnation  thereafter.  1200
Between  December 1989 and mid-
1991, investment  loans grew fastest  1000
for A firms.  It is only after mid-  800 
1991 that investment  loans to AAA
firms began growing faster than those  600 -
for A firms.  These results show that  400
"good" firms are investing,  but that
A firms have been receiving  loans as  200 -
well, despite rapidly dropping  oc-  A
capacity utilization  and shrinking  Dec-89  Apr-90  Aug  Dec90  Ap,41  Aug-91  Dec-91  Apr-2
profitability.  AAA  +  AA  A  |
The dynamics  of net lending
(inter firm credit measured  as  Figure 6
receivables  minus payables  - Table 8)
confirms  the view that such credit served as a substitute  for bank loans. This shows up especially
dramatically  in 1992, when the curtailment  of bank loans led to a sharp increase in inter firm
borrowing by A firms.  Lending  by the better off AAA firms stabilizes  in 1992, suggesting  that
greater caution is being exercised by them.
Table 8: Net Interfirm Lending  To Sales  (%, selected  months)
i________  Dec-89  Jun-90  Dec-90  Jun-91  Dec-91  Jun-92
AAA  68.5  100.3  54.6  81.2  54.1  54.1
AA  59.4  104.6  43.7  53.6  -97.4  -6.1
A  64.7  71.4  49.9  37.7  -32.8  -33.2
Note: Manufacturing  firms are net lenders to distributors  and to other manufacturers.
The last leakage  at the micro level is tax arrears.  Table 9, which gives arrears as a
percentage  of taxes due, shows that this has been substantial  for both AA and A firms.  Further, since
A firms by definition  do not owe income  tax in 1992, it can be concluded  that the arrears are in
respect of dividend  and PPWW  payments. In contrast, AAA firms are virtually  current on tax
payments.13
Table 9:  Tax Arrears To Taxes Due (%)
1  1990  11991  1992
l  AAA  1.8  3.3  3.7
AA  0.2  17.4  26.8
A  5.0  42.7  50.8
II.4.A  Evolution  of Interest Costs
The preceding evidence  suggests  that A firms kept themselves  afloat by financing  growing
inventories  through increased working capital  loans.  This shows  up dramatically  in the ratio of
working capital interest to sales for the three groups of firms (Table 10). A firms have consistently
exhibited  the highest interest ratio.  Not only this, but the gap in relation  to AAA firms has widened
with time, from a ratio of almost 2 for the year 1990  to 3.5 for the first six months of 1992.
Table 10: Working Capital  Interest/Sales  (%)
1990  1  1991  1992
____  ___  _  _  ___  ___  __  ___  ___  (1-6)  J
AAA  3.2  3.5  2.7
AA  2.3  2.4  1.9
A  6.1  11.3  9.6
Table II  contains  remarkable  information  on the ratio of total interest on working capital and
investment  loans to sales.  The evolution  of these numbers captures  the rapid borrowing for
investment  by A firms combined  with declining  real sales (hence low capacity  utilization). The gap
here between AAA and A firms widens even more rapidly than above.
Table 11:  Total Interest/Sales  (%)
1  1990  1991  1992
___I___  ___  ~~~(1-6)
AAA  4.2  5.8  6.3
AA  3.8  3.2  2.7  l
A  6.3  19.7  27.5
Figure 7 plots the amount of profits before interest and taxes being absorbed by interest
payments (cumulatively  within-years,  by quarter). As expected,  interest payments  exceed such profits
for A firms after mid-1991. Beyond  this point, A firms as a group were unable to service their debt.
11.5  Wage Setting  and Decapitalization
SOEs entered the ETP with at least two disadvantages:  excess labor; and inefficient  materials
and energy consumption  owing to distorted  pre-ETP  prices.  The first would require labor shedding,14
the second investments  to enhance
efficiency. The fear has been that
Workers' Council-dominated  SOEs  Interest Burden
would lack the will to take either  (cumulative)
remedial measure. Above, evidence  250.0x-
has been presented  on high labor
shedding  by the sample  firms.  This  200.0%-
section discusses  wage behavior and  150.0%-
decapitalization.
100.0%-
A general perception  of SOEs  0
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company into the ground and then
approach  the government  for a  [AAA  +AAIf  I  A
bailout.  It has also been felt that the
only way to eliminate  this possibility
would be to rapidly privatize. The  Figure  7
excess wage tax, PPWW, which was
originally imposed  to control inflation,  soon became  a penalty on wage increases  in SOEs. Thus, the
private sector was exempted  from the PPWW in 1991. At the same time, the basis for determining
norm wages was changed from the wage bill to average wages, which meant that firms shedding labor
could start paying  more excess wage taxes.  More recent proposals  in the context of the Pact on SOEs
(discussed  below) focus on the distribution  of enterprise surplus  among wages, retained  earnings  and
taxes. Throughout,  the guiding principle  has been that SOEs, being myopic, would rather increase
wages than invest  and protect the long-run interests  of the firm.
This section asks two questions:  who pays PPWW? And: are these also the most
decapitalized  firms? The answer is that the most profitable  firms pay the most PPWW but are the
least decapitalized. In fact, these firms (the AAA) are also the ones which have been investing  the
most.  The results demonstrate  that the image of SOEs as short-sighted  decapitalizers  is highly
exaggerated.
Table 12 on average wages for selected  months  shows that all three groups were level at the
beginning. Thereafter, a comparison  of the AAA and A firms shows that AAA wages were about
25% ahead by December 1991; but the gap narrowed to 17% by June, with AAA firms actually
freezing nominal wages, while  these rose for AA and A firms.  Notably,  the AAA wage in June 1992
was significantly  below the national  average of zloty 2.4 million reported by GUS.
Table 12:  Average Wages  For Selected  Months (Thousands  of zlotys per worker)
_______J__Dec-89  June-90  tec-90  June-91  Dec-91  June-92 
AAA  658  918  1568  1573  2178  2169
|  AA  765  1014  1763  1334  1885  2017
A  603  852  1395  1440  1737  18581S
Table 13 on PPWW  per worker (accrued,  not necessarily  paid) for the years 1990  and 1991
and the first half of 1992  show that AAA firms  have been paying the highest  excess  wage taxes,
demonstrating  the link between  higher  profits and wages. In 1992 in particular  AAA firms are
accruing  much more PPWW, and also paying  it (recall  Table 9 on tax arrears).
Table 13: PPWW per Worker (Thousands  of Zlotys)
J  1990  1991  1992
(1.6)
AAA  3655  6500  1635
AA  5675  4740  219
A  1319  1518  256
In assessing  wage restraint, however,  a useful measure  is provided  in Figure 8, which plots
the share of wage costs in a crude measure  of gross value added (pre-tax  profit plus depreciation  plus
wage costs = GVA). The starting  point for the graph is arfificially  low because  of the stock profits
of late 1989 and early 1990.  Further, there was a huge compression  of real wages  in first quarter
19°50  to offset the shock of higher costs  and interest  rates.  The collapse  of GVA underlies  the sharply
rising share of wage costs in OVA  for A firms, virtually  consuming  all the GVA  by 1992. For AAA
firms, this share rises, but does so at a diminishing  rate. These results  show that the higher wages in
AAA fms  are accompanied  by a maintenance  of surplus  generation.
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Table 14 contains  two measures  of decapitalization.  The first is the ratio of accrued PPWW
to disposable  cash, which  represents  the constraint  on paying  PPWW after income  tax and the
dividend, and adding  back depreciation,  which  is a non-cash  expense. The second  captures  the claims
on pre-tax profit, namely, income  tax, dividend  and PPWW. If the sum of these  claims exceeds  pre-
tax profit, then the excess  must cut into the depreciation  allowance  or be funded  by increased
borrowing. According  to the first measure, AAA firms and AA firms have roughly  the same results;
but A firms are clearly in a state of decapitalization.  The time path of the second  measure  is
interesting. All three groups were more-or-less  level at the end of 1990; but both  AA and A firms
indicate  decapitalization  thereafter.  (A firns as a group had pre-tax losses in 1991  and 1992.)16
Table 14:  Two Measures of Decapitalization
PPWW/Disposable  Cash (%)  (IT + DT + PPWW)/Profit  II
1990  1991  1992  1990  1991  1992
(1-6)  (1-6)
AAA  9.8  18.5  7.9  AAA  43.4  63.9  58.2
AA  12.1  20.0  1.9  AA  50.2  195.1  189.7
A  7.1  -11.5  -4.0  A  52.0  -26.6  -25.3
Notes:  1. Disposable  cash is  profit II - income tax - dividends + depreciation.
2. IT =  income  tax; DT = dividends. Also see Glossary.
These  results clearly  establish  that there is no direct connection  between  incurring  the PPWW and
decapitalization. Low disposable  cash could result from a high dividend  tax burden, while big interest
payments will directly reduce profit II.  Table 15 on the ratio of dividend payments to profits after
income tax demonstrates  that there is no link between  this tax and actual earnings, as would be the case
in a market economy.
Table 15: Dividends/Profits  After Income Tax (%)
11990  1991  1992 I  __  ___  ___  ____  ___  __  ___  ___  ___  (1-6)
|  AAA  7.9  13.9  16.7
AA  17.6  302.4  239.6
|A  14.7  -18.9  -22.6
Lastly, Table 17 shows that investments  comfortably  exceed depreciation  for both AAA and AA
fimrms  in 1990 and 1991; but are lower for A firms, confirming  decapitalization. However, Table 16
reinforces the conclusion that high PPWW payments are not the cause of decapitalization: PPWW
payments were much lower than depreciation  in all cases.
Table 16: PPWW/Depreciation  (%)  Table 17: Investrnents/Depreciation
1990  1991  1992  1  1 1990  1991
________________________  (1-6  )11  _  _  _  _  _ I  _  _  _  _  _  _ I
AAA  |  73.4  |  42.7  17.3  AAA  147  144
AA  36.2  17.0  1  .9  AA  125  134
A  |  35.9  [  12.8  3.9  |  A  82  8017
I1.6  Profit and Cost Dvnamics
The sharp contrast  between  the performance  of AAA  and A firms is brought  out by Figure 9 on
underlying  profitability  (see Glossary  - underlying  profitability  attempts to track the profit rate on the
basic  business of firms, abstracting  from sales of assets  and net extraordinary  gains). AAA firms are
remarkably  consistent  over time. Interestingly,  there  was not much to choose  between  AAA  and A firms
at the start of the sample period; but the gap widens  with time.  Not surprisingly,  the ratio of other
income (mainly, sales and leasing  of assets)  to sales is the highest  for A firms (Figure 10 plots this by
quarter for 1991  and 1992).
Underlying  Profitability  Other Income/Sales
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The preceding discussion  on adjustment  is sumuarized in Figure 11, which shows the varying
shares  of underlying  profits  and costs  in sales for 1990, 1991  and  the first  half of 1992. Costs  are broken
down into their main components  consistent  with the previous  discussion  on adjustment:  materials and
energy; labor; interest (working  capital and investment  loans; bank charges); and a residual  category.Y
AAA  firms maintain  underlying  margins  throughout  and keep  interest  expenses  in check. The increasing
efficiency  in materials  and energy  consumption  is evident  from the chart. Labor costs  rise over time, but
one must recall that these  were compressed  in 1990  to accommodate  higher input and interest  costs.  For
A firms, the story is one of rapidly  growing  interest  payments  and labor costs (in spite of the fastest  rate
of labor  shedding  among  the sample  firms). Profits  all but disappear  with  a small  underlying  loss in 1992
(not visible from the chart).  Given  that materials  and energy costs are amply  covered, however,  these
4Finns report two categories  of costs: (a) costs  of sales (without  any breakdown);  and (b) total costs  per quarter,  which  are
also broken  down into individual  cost items  (nterat  etc).  Total  costs  refer to costs  of production,  which  go partly into sales  and
partly  into  inventory  accumulation.  For Figure  11,  the breakdown  of the  cost of sales is obtained  by takng the individual  cost items
reported  in total costs and scaling  by the ratio of the costs  of sales  to total costs.18
firms could  have  potential  with  downsizing  and  debt  reacturimg.
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I.7  EXpOrts  as an Index of Adjustment
Hard currency exports took off in 1990 leading to an almost embarrassingly  large increase in
reserves  that rendered  use of the one billion  dollar Zloty Stabilization  Fund unnecessary.'  Ever since,
two questions  have arisen: (a) what motivated  this increase  in exports? And (b) can hard currency  export
performance  be taken as a signal that Polish  firms are capable  of competing  at international  levels?
Based  on firm-level  evidence,  an important  finding  in the first phase of this study was that the
export boom was a result of a switch  to the West  owing  to the domestic  demand  barrier, not a response
to higher export profitability. In fact, export  profitability  feU  to low and even negative levels by first-
quarter 1991,  mirroring  the real appreciation  of the zloty  during 1990  and early 1991  (when  the exchange
rate remained  fixed at its lamuary  1, 1990  level).
Can the export boom be interpreted  as a confirmation  of the suipply  response  capacity  of Polish
firms and their ability to meet western  standards? It does not matter  whether the diversion  was from the
domestic  market or eastern export markets,  as both  had the same  quality  requirements,  and diversion  in
either case would  represent ability to meet the more stringent  standards  of the west.
Diversion  from the domestic  and eastern  export markets to the west is obvious from aggregate
data: hard currency exports grew by some 40% while total  industrial sales fel  by 23% and CMEA
6 81 hMs  does  wt mea ditu  de fiud was  Irelevat, a it provided  an or aw signal  of credibDit  .19
exports shrank by 10%; but it is not so obvious is that this meant an ability to meet western quality
standards. The hard currenicy  export  boom coincided  with the persistence  of CMEA  trade in 1990,  which
led to continued subsidization  of energy (gas) and material (iron ore) inputs at the same time that trade
with the west was liberalized and the transferable ruble/dollar rate (implied by the zloty/dollar and
zloty/transferable  ruble rate) depreciated  significantly,  going from 2.97 TR/$ in 1989 to 4.52 TR/$ in
1990.7/ In fact, the boom was the most prominent  in chemicals  and metallurgy  sectors, both benefiting
directly or indirectly from implicit CMEA subsidies on the inputs side.  The relative profitability of
exporting to the west increased so drastically,  especially  for firms importing inputs from the east that it
is likely that firms that could re-orient did so en masse in 1990, without  waiting for the 1991 CMEA
collapse  and dollarization  of prices. In short, it is tempting  to believe  that most of the re-orientation  took
place in 1990 and those firms that were affected  in 1991  were those  that simply  could not sell in the west
at any price.
This view was tested  by asking  managers  of metallurgy  and chemicals  finns (where  the boom was
strong) the following  direct questions:
(i) The hard currency export boom to Area II in 1990  was a result of:  (a) diverting essentially
the same products earlier sold in the CMEA and Polish markets to the West; (b) selling new
products.
(ii) Firms that could, based on product  quality  and technology,  already diverted  sales from Area
I to Area II immediately  in 1990, without  waiting for the 1991  collapse:  (a) Yes (b) No.
The following  answers  were obtained:w
Table 18:  1990 Export Boom
|  Answer  % of Total Exports
Involved"
I.
The same product  91
Diversion in 1990  89
1/ Total exports  refer to the 1990  exports  of the firms polled.
7/ 1 Tis  can be seen by writing  a simplified  profit function  in dollars as follows:  profit($)  per unit of exports= p2 - p..m/E,
where  p. is the (sticky)  dollar  price of unit  exports  to the west,  p  is  the (sticky)  ruble  price  of imports,  m is the volume  of imported
CMEA inputs  per unit of exports  (fixed  by short-run  technology),  and E is the implied TR/S rate.  The  depreciation  of E raised
unit profitability  of exports  to the west at the same  time  that a demand  constraint  appeared  in the home  market.
"/These  firms  were the same  subset  for which  regression  results  were  presented  in  phase 1, representing  a significant  22% and
33% of totl  metallurgy  and chemicals  exports  in 1990.20
The answers  show that firms exporting  to the west in 1990  were selling the samne  products and
had achieved diversion  to western markets; but these firns were not necessarily  more competitive  or
better adjusted  than those selling at home under the pressure of low import barriers.  Exceptions  are
possible, although  as managers  pointed out, it is almost impossible  to develop new products and adjust
technology  in one year.  Regarding  implicit  CMEA subsidies,  the clearest  answer obtained  was from a
chemicals  firm manager:  "In 1990, energy  in the form of ,gas  was cheap. We exported  it in the form
of fertilizer." Managers stressed  the following:
(i) exports were concentrated  in so-called  "dirty technology"  products, namely, fertilizer and
semi-processed  steel.  Western  firms were interested  ftr three reasons:  first, importing reduced
pollution  at home and pollution-related  charges;  Polish  firms sold these products at a discount
facilitated  by cheap energy and raw material from the then Soviet Union; these products are
standardized,  and are not required  to meet complicated  ttechnological  or quality requirements.
(ii) the boom was a natural  response  to liberalization  and the removal  of export licensing.
(iii)  some western competitors were taken aback by  the  rising exports of  metallurgical
products and Polish firms were given signals that unless they reigned in,  there could be
"repercussions".  Managers  felt that  even  after 1997,  when  EC barriers  go, there will be informal
restrictions.
Figure 12 plots the quarterly  exports-to-sales  ratio for the three groups of firms, AAA, AA and
A.  Looking  at the two ends of the spectrum,  A firms were ahead  to start with. By the end of 1990,  the
shares had evened out, though A firms then gradually  went ahead once more.  This confims earlier
findings,  that increased  hard currency  exports  cannot as a ruie be taken as an index of adjustment.
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These  results  support  the view  that in a neutral  trade regirne  with  no anti-export  bias, no QRs  and
low tariffs (which  describes Poland's trade regime  during the ETP), efficient  import substitution  is as
valuable  as exporting,  as both boost the supply of tradables  and the trade balance. Trade liberalization
imposes  discipline  on all firms producing  tradables,  whether exported  or sold at home.21
II.7.A  Role of Foreign Trade Companies
State-owned  Foreign Trade Companies  (FTCs) played an important role in the  1990 boom.
According  to managers, their significance  has diminished  over time for two reasons: high commissions;
inability  to sometimes  offer the quality  of service  expected  by manufacturers. Increasingly,  the tendency
is for firns to develop  direct contact  with wesierm  clients. The only exceptions  seem to be in trade with
the former CMEA block; and in cases where FTCs have brand-name recognition,  e.g.,  in some food
exports. 9' According  to sample firms, the share of FTCs in total export sales dropped from almost 90%
in 1990  to just over 50% in 1992, with  direct sales to westem  clients and sales through  new private agents
reaching 27% and 16%, respectively  in 1992.
11.8  Social Assets
In the period January 1990-March  1991 covered  by Phase I of the study, social assets (vacation
resorts, health centers, sports amenities, cafeterias, kindergartens, hostels, cultural centers, vocational
schools and many more) and worker housing represented a significant  financial and huge managerial
burden, with no apparent solution in sight.
The rapidly deteriorating financial condition of firms in 1991 did little to help the situation.
Although  the problem  is still consi, -red serious  by managers,  evidence  this year indicates  that imaginative
solutions have been developed, foL  using largely on cost recovery:
o -kindergartens  and schools  have been handed  over to local authorities
o cafeterias  have been converted into showrooms
o redundant  spaces and all sorts of buildings  are leased  out and/or converted  into retail shops and
warehouses
o vacation resorts and worker hotels are leased  out or operated on a commercial  basis
o sports stadiums  have been offered  to the city, which picks up the operating cost.
Generally, the assets are taken over by commnunities,  often free, rented or bought by small and
mid-size  private firms, or by ventures  set up by former  employees  of the enterprise. Rental contracts  are
commnon,  one firm having no fewer than 54!  r'evertheless, social assets remain on the books as sale is
difficult  owing to the glut of such assets on the market and unclear ownership  rights.  Giving the assets
away is slowed both by the costs for a potential  donor (gift tax, obligation  to establish clear ownership
title) and the reluctance  of potential  benefactors  owing  to high maintenance  costs. It should  be noted  that
most assets are in decent condition  and do not require much investment  to continue  operation.
Interestingly,  resistance of workers to the divesting  of social assets has been minimal  (with only
a handful  of exceptions). The reason is that firms do not have resources  to operate these  assets properly,
91 FrCs have seen the writing  on the wall regarding  their  diminished  role  as pure trading  houses,  based  on conversations  with
them. More  and more, they are attempting  to integrate  backwards  into  manufacturing  to exploit  their advantages  in financing  and
foreign  market  contacts.22
so the benefits have diminished  anyway.
While being an unnecessary  burden in times of crisis, social assets never really weighed  that
heavily in the cost structure. In most frins,  these costs accounted  for less than 2% Of  total cost, while
only in 4 (out of 71) did this surpass 5%.  Managers  stressed the easing the managerial  burden as the
main benefit.
Worker housing  is by far the biggest  problem,  especially  for the larger finns, albeit  not as severe
as last  year.  Managers noted  that the financial  burden  had decreased  owing to the rise in controlled  rents
and utilities, which apply to firm-owned  housing  as well. Many offered concrete suggestions:
(i) remove worker housing from the umbrella  of controlled  rents and utilities and permit com
mercial operation
(ii) enact laws allowing  eviction  of non-workers,  who benefit from the firm-financed  subsidies
(iii) create a system of owner mortgages  (which applies  more generally)
(iv) speed up clarification  of ownership  rights and titles to property  so that firms can more easily
divest themselves  of such property, even giving  flats away free.'"'
It is worth noting  that the "Pact  on SOEs" has recognized  the need to address title and ownership
of such "superfluous"  assets.  It should  also be stressed  that at this stage, the problem is largely a legal
one relating to property rights and will not be solved by privatization  alone.  To the contrary, private
investors may be deterred without  resolution  of this issue.
1.9  Improved  Distribution
In 1989, sta.e-organized  wholesale trade, frequently enjoying (local) monopoly power began
disintegrating. By the end of 1990, liberalization  of wholesale  trade brought growing competition  from
private firms.  Coupled  with high interest rates and weakening  domestic  demand, traditional  networks  in
nearly all sectors collapsed.
This became  a real challenge  for SOE manufacturers,  never  well-equipped  in marketing  and after
sales service and unaccustomed  to dealing with a multitude of small, frequently financially unviable
customers.  Moreover, the new traders, predominantly  consisting of small private  "wholesalers",
preferred dealing with private importers  owing to their greater flexibility  and cooperation  in tax evasion.
The collapse of traditional trade networks greatly strengthened import competition, particularly in
consumer  goods, and contributed  to the crisis in the state industrial  sector.
After the initial shock, SOEs started responding. Where possible, producers have established
direct contact with the ultimate consumers  or with retailers.  In metallurgy, managers reported that in
1992  over 80% of sales were direct deliveries  to the ultimate  user, ir. electromachinery  only slightly  less.
Two years earlier steel mills had only a few customers,  sometimes  one, who would  take care of the whole
distribution  process, with the producer  fully isolated  from the market.
101 Otherwise, £  firm must first buy the asset at book value before giving it away.23
In consurrier  goods sectorE  such as food processing  and light manufacturing,  a similar process is
under way.  Over half of output is sold directly to retailers to avoid wholesalers' commissions  and
contacts with often unviable and small partners.  Firms are getting rid of unreliable  partners, choosing
better ones, and strengthening  them through a system  of price concessions  and relaxed  terms of payment
in return for controlling  prices and territorial distribution of deliveries.  This however is part of the
solution  only.  The best firms are building  up their own networks  of reliable distributors  for wholesaling
and storage, sometimes  supplemented  with factory-spolisored  retail shops.
Improving distribution is not regarded an easy task.  It takes financial resources, resolution and
competence. In many respects, it is more difficult for the SOEs to sell on the domestic market than
abroad, where quality requirements  are higher  but distribution  networks  better.  All in all, improvement
of distribution is considered  one of the most important  indicators  of adjustment.24
Hi  KEY ASPECTS  OF TRANSFORMATION
Quantitative evidence and  discussions with managers indicate that  four stimuli have been
paramount in inducing  firms to adjust:
(i) trade libexalization  has forced  firms to abandon  c'st  plus pricing  and pay attention  to costs and
efficiency  - with some success as the previous section showed
(ii)  the determination of  GOP to  eliminate manufacturing subsidies and external support
mechanisms  has compelled  firms to focus on internal  efficiency  and take the initiative  for change
(iii) likewise, the realization  that GOP does not have the resources  for a bailout has led firms to
rely on their own resources to find new products and markets
(iv)  managers identify their success with that of the firm and realize that based on their
experience, they have a future with the SOE as is or when it is privatized.
This section  discusses  elements  of this transformation,  namely, the hardening  of the micro budget
constraint, PPWW reform and managerial  attitudes  and incentives.
1I. 1  Hardening  of the Micro Budget  Constraint
The quantitative  sample  evidence  (section  11.4)  on growing bank and interfirm loans to A firms
in the face of sharply dininished sales and debt servicing capacity  finds its echo in the economy-wide
deterioration of bank loan portfolios  and the gridlock  caused  by interfirm  debts.  However, the laxity in
bank loans considerably reduces in  1992.  Managers felt that the firm-level budget constraint had
hardened and was now credible.
IIl..A  Changing  Bank Behavior
Competition  among banks for the limited number of sound clients is on the rise, the adverse
selection of loans is diminishing and good firms are bargaining with banks for lower interest rates.
Managers  unanimously  report radically  changed  bank behavior. As they describe  it, in 1990  banks acted
like "cashiers",  eager to dole out money. By 1992, banks were behaving  like "partners"  with an equity
stake in the company  and had become  highly quality conscious.
Tables 19 and 20 show the changing  perceptions  of managers  over time regarding the ease of
obtaining  credit and the level of involvement  of banks in enterprise operations  (average based on a 0-5
point scale ranking)."'  These results show that AAA firms experience the same ease in getting loans
as in 1990, while  there is a sharp diminution  for A firms in 1992. Impressively,  all types of firms report
increased  bank involvement.
11 "n  such responses,  the trend is more  relevant  and easier  to evaluate  than the absolute  value  of the response.25
Table 19: Ease of Obtaining  Bank Credit  Table 20: Involvement  of Banks
1990  1  1991  1992  ]  1990  1991  1992
AAA  3.0  2.8  3.2  AAA  2.5  3.0  3.2
AA  3.1  2.4  1.3  AA  3.1  3.6  3.7
A  3.2  2.0  1.2  A  2.4  2.6  2.8
Total  Total
Sample  3.1  2.3  2.2  Sample  2.6  2.9  3.1
An improvement  in the credit assessment  of banks can also be inferred from the fact that of
25 enterprises denied credit in the last two years, 21 were A and only 4 were AAA. But the reason
typically given was the general condition  of the firm rather than the unviability  of the project for
which funds were sought. This points to a continuing  weakness  in project evaluation.
When asked why they believed  bank behavior  was changing,  two replies prevailed: (a) banks
have no option but to change owing to their vanishing  net worth and deteriorating  portfolios  (most
frequent reply); (b) banks, like enterprises, are learning. Although  managers  never alluded to it,
there is a remarkable  coincidence  between  perceptions  regardino  tighter bank behavior  and the change
in the governance in late 1991 of the 9 commercial  banks spun off from NBP (commercialization,
supervisory  board control, strict monitoring  by MOF, including  a freeze in lending  to some 2000
suspect firms - not all SOEs). At the same time, banks have been benefiting  from the skills
transference  flowing from twinning  with foreign  banks.
Summing  up, three positive developments  are under way: (a) obviously  good firms are actively
wooed by banks to borrow; (b) banks were considered  to have increased  their involvement  in
enterprise operations  and assessment  of prospects  even in cases where firms were no longer receiving
loans; (c) good firms are now switching  banks to bargain for lower interest rates.
II.11.  B Internal Financial  Mana ement
The budget  constraint is also hardening  internally. More and more, firms have installed  cash
management  and reporting systems. Profit centers have been created  in some cases to pinpoint
responsibility  and ease performance  measurement. There are unmistakable  signs that financial
management  is strengthening.
m. .c Inter firm Credit
There has been a remarkable  change  here.  Good firms are no longer interested  in supporting
weaker ones.  Firms frequently  create their own ranking  lists of buyers, specifying  which will be dealt
with only on cash terms, which will receive  two weeks' credit, and which will not be supplied  at all.
Some make use of published lists of firms in conciliatory  proceedings  published  in newspapers  such as
Rzeczpospolita.
HIl.1.D  Tax Arrears
This is the area where least change  is visible, as Table 9 amply showed. Not only has the26
dividend tax criterion not been enforced  (firns found all sorts of ways to persuade local tax chambers
that deferments beyond  the stipulated  3 months for triggering  bankruptcy  were justified), but any large
scale bankruptcy  is not credible because  of limited  court capacity.
111.2  Excess Employment  and the PPWW
The quantitative  evidence  showed  that AAA firms were much more efficient in labor usage
than A firms.  Table 21 contains  managerial  assessments  of excess employment  as of mid-1992.
Table 21: Excess Employment  (number  of firms)
I  0%  5-10%  10-20%  20-30%  >  30%
AAA  2  14  11  2  0
AA  2  4  1  1  0
A  3  6  7  7  0
Total  7  24  19  10  0
Weighting  at the mid-point  of the ranges in the table, A firms estimate  excess employment  at
14% and AAA firms at 11%.  This seemingly  marginal  difference  needs to be put in context. A
firms are typically larger, more labor intensive  and have already shed labor much faster than AAA
firms (section 11.2). The higher excess employment  reported by A firms is consistent  with Figure 8,
which shows labor costs consuming  an ever increasing  share of value added.  Labor reduction will
obviously  be an important  part of any restructuring  plan for A firms.
Managers  by-and-large  indicated  that mass layoffs were not on the cards for 4 main reasons:
(a) legal and financial  constraints  (high severance payments),  (b) resistance  of the TUs; (c)
humanitarian  considerations,  (d) expectations  of sales revival. The first reason is the most pronounced
within loss-making  enterprises, whereas the "social  and humanitarian"  concerns  are stressed more by
AAA firms.  The motives for labor shedding reported by managers  are interesting. Falling sales and
organizational  changes  (splitting up of companies)  were mentioned  in all interviews. In AAA firms
introduction  of new, labor-saving  technologies  received  a high priority, indicating  a new positive
aspect of adjustment.
Has PPWW helped or hurt labor rationalization? Section 1I.5  showed  that PPWW is paid by
the best firms, which are also the least decapitalized. As expected  from an instrument  as controversial
as the excess wage tax (PPWW), managerial  attitudes  were mixed, though generally  negative. PPWW
was blamed for hampering  work force rationalization  and flattening  the wage structure owing to the
"average  wage norm" basis for excess wage taxation. On a 0-5 scale, its negative  impact  on the wage
structure was put at 4.3.
Managers attributed  the change in formula for wage indexation  from the wage bill in 1990 to
the average wage norm in 1991  to a desire to minimize  unemployment,  i.e., to meet social rather than
economic  goals.  With only 4 exceptions  out of 63, managers  believe  the wage bill formula is
superior.  Any attempt to shed labor, which is in excess, automatically  raises the average wage.  An
extreme example  of the perverse effects of the average wage norm was given by a firm in dire straits
that shed 600 workers (259%  of its work force) and found it had to pay the PPWW because  the27
average wage then exceeded  the norm.  Managers complained  that the average wage formula directly
impeded  work force management:  hiring a good worker (who costs more) raises the average wage;
while firing a bad worker (who costs less) does exactly  the same. A wage bill norm would help speed
up labor rationalization  and also improve the relative wage structure.
Last year's assertion  that strong managers with a clear, long-run  vision of the firm did not
need the PPWW to contain wage demands  was frequently  repeated. Managers  expressed irritation at
having to still deal with the PPWW, whose  role and time they felt had passed. They complained
about the time it wasted and the discrimination  it represented  vis-a-vis  the private sector. On the
other side of the coin, some managers  (both of profitable  and loss making  firms) said that the PPWW
presented a solid excuse for not raising  wages; but others complained  that it was impossible  to offer
workers rational incentives,  a constraint  private firms did not face.  It was admitted  in 41 out of 63
questionnaires  that removal of PPWW would result in a wage increase,  with AAA firms likely to raise
wages more often and more generously  than A firms.  However, only a handful of those that would
increase wages expected  the jump to exceed 20% (section  II.5 contains  evidence  of considerable  wage
restraint by AAA firms in 1992, despite  high capacity  for paying  the PPWW). Managers described
wage setting as influenced  by the following:  (a) comparisons  with national  average wages;`  (b)
firm-specific  liquidity; (c) profitability. PPWW  was regarded of reduced  relevance  in wage setting
owing to illiquidity  and low profitability.' 3'
Managers  made three suggestions  on the PPWW:
o uniform  enforcement,  no forgiveness  of tax arrears' 4'
o return to wage bill formula for norm wage calculation
o no exceptions  in rules, simplicity  the best.
Some complained  about the discriminatory  enforcement  of the PPWW. The manager of one
enterprise, which is profitable  and current in all payments,  but where the wage is more or less at the
national average, cited the example  of a shipyard, which was paying about 30% above  the average
wage, was in arrears on the PPWW and had recently  received  a reduction  in debts (including  in
accounts payable to this manager's firm) of one-third. Such resentment  against the most powerftil
giants of the Polish industry was present in many of the discussions  with the interviewed  managers.
What about exceptions  that give some firms a break on the PPWW based on selected
efficiency  criteria? Managers strongly opposed  exceptions,  even when they stood to gain from these.
They mentioned  that exceptions  had never worked.  An example  was given to show that well-meaning
171 When  asked the average  wage, managers  would  give it and then instinctively  compare it to the national  average.  The
national  average  is an important  yardstick  for TUs.
13 1A firm does not actually  have to be paying  the PPWW  for it to limit wages. Merely  the threat of incurring  it could have
a restraining  effect  on wages.
"4'This  statement  was usually  made with respect  to the set of firms (SOEs  and commercialized  firms) to which the PPWW
applies,  although  the sense  of discrimination  in relation  to the private  sector  was  tangible.28
changes  in policy when combined  with other policies, can have perverse effects: the proposed
incentive,  whereby a 100% exporter is exempted  from the PPWW, could lead to a rush to export
semi-processed  steel, thereby hurting  finished steel producers  because the import tariff on semi-
processed steel at 15% exceeds  that on finished  steel (at 3%).  The PPWW incentive  combined with
this inverted cascading  import tariff could  hurt finished  steel producers. This example  points to the
difficulties  of making  exceptions  on PPWW  payments  based on essentially  arbitrary criteria -
managers were quick to point out that during the socialist  times, all sorts of imaginative  schemes  of
exceptions  had been tried and invariably  failed.
III.2.A PPWW Reform
The very fact that the private sector was exempted  from the PPWW starting in 1991 suggests
that the focus changed from inflation  con,rol to other concerns, such as prevention of decapitalization
and the share of wages in enterprise  surplus in the absence  of an owner who would emphasize  long
run considerations. Accordingly,  recent proposals  (such as those contained  in the "Pact on
Enterprises")  have concentrated  on distribution  of enterprise  surplus, determination  of the wage nerm
and actual payment of PPWW based on negotiation  with local tax offices; and simultaneous
elimination  of the dividend.
Enterprise surplus is distributed among  (i) the government  (taxes), (ii) retained earnings
("long-run health of the firm") and (iii) wages. Recent modifications  to the PPWW aim at increasing
the share of the first two components. In contrast to the more complex  modifications  recently  enacted
and proposed in the context of the SOE Pact, which are summarized  and analyzed  in Annex m,
managers' reactions would suggest  a highly simplified  scheme  along the following  lines:
o firms free to choose wage bill or average wage norm (the latter would be preferable  for a
firm with expansion  plans).
o maximum  tax rate reduced  to  100%. This would still deter wage increases  yet give
profitable  firms more scope in deciding  upon wage awards.
o no exceptions  based on export performance  or negotiation  with local tax offices.  '5'
o wage norm growth determined  in the same  manner but with respect to target, rather than ex-
post, inflation.
o retain dividend.
The crucial issue is this: should the focus at this point be on raising revenues  or on medium-
run growth? The fine-tuning  of the PPWW  will focus once again on short-run  wage setting, which
may be inimical to long-run interests of the firm, hence economic  growth. A more positive way of
inducing firms to focus on profits and long-run  health is to simplify  the PPWW along the above lines
15/The  evidence  confirms  that firms  that export  more  cannot  be presumed  to have  adjusted  more  than  those  selling  domestically.
Since  efficient  import  substitution  is at least as valuable  as exports  (especially  given  the domestic  demand  barrier in Poland,  where
a rise in domestic  sales may require  new product  development,  better  packaging  and distribution  to compete  with imports),  there
is no reason  to especially  reward  exports.29
and link managerial compensation  to profits, at the same  time clarifying  the position  and rewards for
management  following  privatization  so that the maximization  of the firm's value becomes paramount.
III.3  Managerial  Attitudes  and Incentives
In the pre-ETP days, the prime managerial  attribute was ability to negotiate  with the central
authorities  on subsidies  and allocations  of inputs and investments  funds under the Central Investments
program. A typical  manager was an engineer, whose  entire professional  career was connected  with the
same enterprise, a specialist  in production, knowing  little of marketing  and financial  management.  On
the other hand, good managers knew how to deal with social  conflicts within firms, a quality still in
high demand in Poland.
Following  the shock therapy of the ETP, the emphasis  shifted  tc profits and marketing,  away
from the old "production  target".  At first, managers  seemed  overwhelmed  by the changes  they had to
deal with: big, sudden changes  in relativ'e  prices; a demand  constraint;  and import competition. In
addition, the SOEs with their social assets, old technology,  excess employment,  and quality problems
hardly seemed the ideal springboard  to a market economy. However, even early in the ETP, it was
clear that there were good and far-sighted  managers. Phase 1 contained  two important  findings as
SOEs struggled  to cope with the new system:
o Managers were typically  the moving  force and inspiration  behind change. Workers'
Councils  played at best a facilitating  role
o Judging from PPWW payments  and wage behavior, SOEs were myopic, with considerable
focus on current wages ("high discount  rate") and little emphasis  on long-term restructuring.
Firm governance  was marked by tension  between  managers  and workers (Workers' Council
and Trade Unions), with limited labor shedding  relative to output fall and high PPWW payments.
This collection  of findings led to the conclusion  that macro stringency  while necessary, would not
suffice  to introduce firm-level  change without  addressing  firm governance,  clarifying  accountability
and responsibility  and introducing  managerial  incentives  that would emphasize  long-run  restructuring.
In this third year of the ETP, published  surveys indicate  that optimism  is up, in spite of huge
problems in embattled  firms.  Managers are looking  to the longer run, there is more self-confidence
and in many cases successful  measures  been taken to improve  enterprises. What has accounted  for
this remarkable change?
III.3.A Optimism
Managers of sample  firms agreed with the published  survey results of the Warsaw Main
School of Commerce  (based on polls of SOE managers)  that optimism is up." 6'  On a 0-5 scale, they
rated the growth in their optimism  in 1992  at 2.5 on average.  Managers in the commercialized  and
privatized  firms in the sample were visibly more optimistic  than those that had remained  SOEs.
Managers in AAA enterprises  expressed  much stronger optimism  (2.8) than AA (1.9) and the loss-
16 1"Business Survey Poland',  Research Institute of Economic Development, Warsaw School of Economics, various monthly
issues in 1992.30
making A firms (2.2).  Although  the general response  to the optimism  question  was moderate,
managers were much more emphatic  about what fed their optimism.
Managers have realized that the government  is not going to help, leading  them to find their
own solutions and new markets. Such "self-help"  coupled  with almost three years of market
experience  has instilled  much self-confidence. It is noteworthy  that after a wave of personnel changes
in 1989-1990,  there has been relative stability  in the top positions, leading to valuable  learning.
There was an interesting  bifurcation  regarding  more positive government  pronouncements  as a
factor molding  optimism. Managers interviewed  earlier in the study (late August, early September)
dismissed  government  pronouncements  as irrelevant; those interviewed  in later September, when
details of the "Pact  on Enterprises"  were being revealed,  were more positive about the government.
However, the importance  of "self-help"  continued  to be recognized.
When challenged  to reconcile  their statements  that self-help  was paramount, yet positive
government  pronouncements  were important,  managers  clarified  that the government  was not being
looked  to for direct help; only for creating  a better climate. Many felt that the only goal of past
governments  was to destroy SOEs; now, the attitude  was described as more positive. Managers cited
the following  as molding  their view (the first two were also cited before Pact details were available):
o reduction in dividend  rate from 22% to 10% as of July I
o proposed  reduction in maximum  PPWW rates next year
o proposed debt restructuring  package as part of "Pact on Enterprises".
l.3.B  Expectations  from GOP
Managers were clear and almost unanimous  about what they expect from GOP:
o low inflation  and interest rates
o stability  in the rules of the game, especially  with regard to taxes and import tariffs.  They
often cited cases where cashflows  from prospective  investments  had changed  drastically
following  a revocation  of a tax credit (for ecological  investments),  or a sudden  increase in an
import tariff
o equality  in treatment for all, private sector, state sector, cooperatives. Some raised concerns
about the proposed  debt write downs, fearing that GOP may not realize how long it takes to
restructure large SOEs, and that it was always  possible to hire a consultant  to write a rosy
report about restoration  of viability  in a few months. Some expressed  doubts about  the
willingness  of the commercial  banks to engage in the debt cancellation/restructuring  effort.
II.3.C Determinants  of Credibility
By and large, managers expect GOP to stick to the original Balcerowicz  line.  Most saw no
alternative, and no chances  of return to the old system (only 9 had any doubts, 4 of them from the
beleaguered  light industry). They were emphatic  about  the determinants  of credibility:31
o absolutely no room for subsidies  or bailout
o no giving in to strikes'
o control of deficit  to avoid an increase in inflation  and interest rates.  Managers repeatedly
stated that planning is very difficult  if inflation  stays high and volatile
o GOP should be consistent. There has been talk of needed  bankruptcy  of the state sector and
its unviability. On the other hand, the state budget is based on the health of the state sector.
o the stop-go attitude towards  mass privatization  has considerably  reduced its credibility.
Managers of successful  companies  that were candidates  for privatization  were concerned  that
the proceeds  would go to finance the deficit  rather than restructure  the company.' 8
It is noteworthy  that managers  did not include in their list of expectations  from GOP the need
for higher import tariffs.  Some even recognized  the need for import competition,  and most were
confident  about their ability to deal with it.  The only plea for protection  cane from a sugar factory,
motivated  by the EC system for agriculture.
The above change in attitude  towards the role of the government  is significant. 1990 was a
year of unsustainable  performance  and minimal  adjustment;  temporary favorable  factors tided firms
through.  1991 was the year of the CMEA shock and hoping for government  help, a hope that quickly
vanished. It marked the start of deeper adjustment. 1992  is a year of self-help and close to zero
expectation  of government  help, the only plea being for stability  in the rules of the game.  This means
that enforcement  of announced  penalties  will be easier.  Affected  firms are not going to get much
sympathy  from other firms, which are paying the price for adjustment. It also means that the criteria
for firms qualifying  for debt workouts  should  be strict and clear.  In short, SOE managers  realize that
many are adapting successfully,  essentially  behaving  like owners of firms.  Further, fears of end-game
conspiracy  type behavior (whereby  mangers  act in concert to precipitate  a crisis of such large size that
GOP is forced to intervene)  must now be regarded as hopelessly  exaggerated. Since examples  of
successful  adjustment  can be pointed to, and since expectation  of bailout is limited  to a small number
of dinosaurs, GOP can pursue a consistent  policy without  a fear of a systemic  backlash.
I.3.D OQptimal  Sequencing  and Attitude to Privatization
Managerial  attitudes  towards  sequencing  were overwhelmingly  in favor of commercialization
(as opposed to remaining  SOEs) and restructuring  prior to privatization. Reasons  given were
straightforward:  potential investors  do not want to talk to Workers' Councils;  the same applies to
firms burdened  with social assets, excess  employment  and unmarketable  products.
17 1This  statement  was made  in the context  of strikes  occurring  in the sununer  of 1992,  which  at one point  threatened  to tunm
into a wave, but fizzled out, with GOP taking a hard line, e.g.,  in the case of the car company,  FSM Tychy, which was in
negotiation  with Fiat. There was little sympathy  expressed  for strikers.
I8At present, privatization  proceeds  are treated  as current revenue,  even  though  sales of assets  are involved.  This artificially
redues the size of the deficit,  putting  less pressure  on GOP to introduce  fundamntal spending  and tax reform. Privatization  is
discussed  funther  below.32
Interestingly,  managers  of commercialized  SOEs were more apt to signal an improvement  in
managerial  compensation,  while  job stability  was assessed  about the same. Also, managers of
commercialized  SOEs reported more positive relations with TUs than managers  of pure SOEs, where
the Workers' Council complicates  the relationship.
It is also noteworthy  that managers  without  exception  underlined  the need for restructuring
prior to privatization,  especially  in view of social assets, excess labor, enterprise division  and in many
cases, the debt overhang.
Regarding  privatization  tracks, skepticism  was expressed about  the MPP owing to:
o lack of clarity on the role of National  Investment  Funds (NIFs) in relation to a specific firm,
and the division of responsibility  and authority between  firm management  and NIFs
o unclear benefits  to firms already deeply restructured
o the assets of the firms to be "given"  to the NIFs even though the latter do not put their own
money at risk
o perception  that the main goal of MPP is to solve budgetary  problems, not restructure  firms.
MI.3.E Managerial  Compensation
The system of managerial  compensation  remains  unchanged  in the state owned enterprises, at
least on paper.  Managers  still receive a multiple  (between  5 and 7) of the national  average wage or
the average wage in the firm and are hired by the Workers' Council (this refers to the non-
commercialized  units).' 9'  This basic wage is determined  by the Workers' Council. There is also a
bonus payment, but the link of managerial  compensation  to profits is weak and has been diminishing
with time: ironically,  this link was the strongest (in terms of specified  percentages  of profits before
tax niinus PPWW)  in 1990, when financial  measurement  was strongly  biased by all sorts of temporary
factors.  Table 22 contains  the bonus coefficients  for different profit levels:
9/One  exception  was  encountered,  where  a manager  had negotiated  with the Workers' Council  to receive  only a percentage
of profits.33
Table 22:  Profits and Managerial  Compensation
Profits  1990  |  1991  1
(zloty billion)  _  (%)  M()
0-0.5  1  1
0.5-1  0.5  0.5
1-5  0.2  0.2
5-10  0.1  0.1
10-20  0.06  0.05
20-30  0.04  0.02
30-40  0.02  0.01
40-50  0.01  0.005
50-100  0.005  0.001
> 100  0.0001  0.0001
Note:  The profit base for this calculation  is Profit II - PPWW.
An example  will show the extremely  weak link between  profits and managerial  reward.  In
1990, if the firm registered  $ 50 million  of profits (before  tax - PPWW), the manager would get
about $ 3800 for the year.  In 1991, this drops to about $ 2800 for the year.  In a case where the
manager's basic wage is 7 times the average wage in the firm, equivalent  compensation  can be
obtained  by a one-time  rise in monthly  wages of about $ 45 per month in 1990  and only $ 33 in 1991.
Figure 13 plots this link, with profits in dollars shown on the x-axis and resulting  bonus, also in
dollars, on the y-axis.  This weak link between  profits and bonus (which reaches an asymptote  of
about $ 3900 in 1990  and $ 2900 in 1991)  creates an automatic  pre-disposition  towards wage
increases  and emphasizes  the short-run. This is obvious  when contrasting  the present system of
managerial  compensation  (MC) in equation  (1) with a system where the link to average wages is
broken and that to profits is strengthened:
(1) MC = K.w + L.profits, K a given multiple, w the average wage and L some percentage
(2) MC = B + C.profits, C a specified  percentage  greater than L.
Regarding  (1), it is obvious  that if K is large enough and L is very small - the case obtaining  in
practice - an increase in wages will lead to larger managerial  compensation. Adopting  a scheme like
(2), which completely  de-links  compensation  from average wages, solves the problem of immediate
compensation;  but the issue of long-run compensation  linked to maximizing  firm value remains.34
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When  managers  who  had clearly  engaged  in deep  resruturing (new  products,  new  markets,
firms  brought  back  from  the verge  of liquidation)  were  asked  what  mouivated  them  to take  a long-um
view  given  the compensation  system,  they  mentoned  emotional  reasons,  patriotism,  personal  ambition
and  the like. However,  a few  candidly  admitted  that  they  expected  to gain  from  privatization,  hoping
to acquire  part  of the  shares  at below-market  prices. This would  he their  deferred  compensation.
Managers  were  secure  about  keeping  thei jobs after  privatization;  their  reasoning  is that they  are the
best repository  of restructuring  talent  in this economy  and even  if fired,  would  easily  find new  jobs.
MI.3.F  S&I  A
The formal  compensation  package  for managers,  which  emphasizes  the short-run  at the
expense  of maximizng  the long-nm  value  of the firm,  needs  to be remedied.  First,  there  should  be
transparency  of rules,  not a vague  hope  that  the Supervisory  Board  or Founding  Organ  wffl  deem  it
fit to reward  a good  manager. Second,  the  need  for a suitably  designed  management  contrdac  is of
paramount  importanc,  clarPifyn  statu after  privauiaton  and  mode  of compensation.  In fact,
privatization,  the long-run  health  of the firm  and managerial  reward  can  be made  congruent  through
such  clarification  and  the increasing  adoption  of decenrali  approaches  to transformation  such  as
MBOs  and privatizaon  thrugh management  conacts.
This view  is reinforced  by the  observation  that  managers  support  privatization,  perceiving  it
as an opportunty  for themselves. Of  course,  the  behavior  of managers  prior  to privatization  wil
depen on what  they  expect  to gain  from  ownership  change.  There  can  be a positive  impact  if
incentives  are clear  and rules  of the gawe  stable;  buit  a negative  inmpact  when  uncertinty  prevails.35
The delay in privatization,  the need for restructuring  prior to privatization  and the need to
capitalize  on the big investment  in managerial  capital  that has occurred  through learning-by-doing
duing  the ETP highlights  the importance  of designing  suitable  managerial  compensation  that
emphasizes  firm value maximization. The following  could  be part of a package:
(a) dissolve Workers' Councils
(b) strengthen  significantly  the link of managerial  compensation  to profits
(c) clarify the position  of managers following  privatization  as well as their reward, e.g.,  10%
of the shares at 50% of the price; inc:ude  managers  in the process of privatization  through
management  buyouts and management  contracts  aimed at privatization
(d) simplify  the PPWW as discussed  in section IlI.2.A
(e) require auditing of accounts  by certified  external  auditors  to provide some checks.36
IV  CONCLUDING  REMARKS
Reforming  the state manufacturing  sector in emerging  market economies  is a hotly debated
topic, with prescriptions  abounding  but little systematic  microeconomic  evidence  on actual
developments. This paper tries to fill this gap.  In contrast to the negative  stereotype  of SOEs that
dominates  discussion  of the state manufacturing  sector, the evidence  in this study shows that there is
encouraging  news.  Not only are success  stories based on solid adjustment  emerging, these are to be
found in all sectors, indicating  Poland's potential  for a diversified  manufacturing  base.
Successful  firms have improved  efficiency  in materials  and energy usage, have maintained
labor productivity  and have shown restraint both in borrowing  from banks and in setting wages.
Further, firms paying the highest  wages are the most profitable,  but also the least decapitalized.
T:iese are the success stories, with their managers  the most often stressing  product  mix changes  as a
factor stimulating  sales.
Less successful  firms are burdened  with excess labor and are increasingly  unable to service
their debt.  Any restructuring  package for these firms is bound  to involve  at a minimum  not oniy debt
workouts, but drastic downsizing.
The quantitative  evidence  shows that the industrial  recovery showing  up in aggregate  statistics
has a solid microeconomic  foundation  and will therefore be sustained. Behaviorally,  there has been a
certain maturation  since the big bang which is beginning  to pay dividends  in the third year of the
ETP.
First, managers  have learnt a great deal in the last two-and-a-half  years of operating  in a
market enviromnent. Second, there is a close to zero expectation  of government-sponsored  bailout.
Third, end-game  behavior (whereby  SOEs operate in concert to perversely  precipitate  a bankruptcy
crisis) makes sense only if the probability  of a bail-out  is high.  With both workers  and managers
convinced  that this will not be the case, firm horizons have lengthened. Fourth, the behavior of
banks, which acted as a safety valve in 1990  and part of 1991, has radically  changed. In short, the
micro budget  constraint has hardened. This has undoubtedly  impacted  firm behavior. Fifth, worker
attitudes  are also gradually changing. Managers  of firms in difficulty  reported that when faced with
bankruptcy,  worker behavior  changes, especially  when no bailout is in the offing.  Managers from the
less successful  A firms reported more positive  support from the unions and Workers' Councils  than
those from the successful  AAA firms.  Interestingly,  managers  of AAA firms were in a strong
position  because  they had shaped the firm and it was unlikely that the Workers' Council  would
dismiss a competent  manager in the present recession,  especially  when managerial  talent is scarce.
To the contrary, managers  have been replaced  only when the firm was in dire straits and the manager
was blamed for not formulating  effective  restructuring  plans.  The turnover rate in managerial  posts is
visibly lower for AAA firms than in loss making firms.
The fact that SOEs, which are autonomous,  are turning around bodes well for decentralized
approaches  to ownership transformation. However,  the crucial issue of managerial  incentives  aimed
at maximizing  firm value en route to privatization  has been neglected. It is important  to design
suitable incentive  mechanisms  to capitalize  on the investment  in human capital that has taken place
during the last three years as SOE managers  have learnt how to operate in a market system.
This priority is heightened  by the observation  that a restructured  and eventually  privatized37
state manufacturing  sector holds the key to medium run growth. While the new private sector and
foreign investors have a crucial role, this must be in conjunction  with the energy flowing from a
reformed state sector.20'  The state sector can achieve  this in two ways: directly, as a result of the
benefits  flowing from a more efficient  state sector; indirectly  as a result of resources released for use
by new entrants. However, the road is more complicated  than initially  believed  and restructuring
prior to privatization  is all but inevitable. Table 23 summarizes  the preceding  discussion. It is
worthy of emphasis  that of all the instruments  listed in the table, obvious progress ha&  been made
only on two counts: (a) clear signal that there will be no bailout of firms; (b) correct relative prices.
There is a long way yet to go.
Table 23:  Objectives  and Instruments  in Relation  to SOEs
Obiective  Instruments
1.  Long horizon  0  No bailout (i.e., hard budget constraint)
("anti-myopia")  0  Managerial  incentives
o  Abolish  Workers' Councils
2. Efficient restructuring  0  Debt restructuring
O  Labor reduction
O  Legislative  support for divestment  of social
assets and worker housing
O  Decentralized  approaches  to privatization
3. Efficient  resource allocation  0  Correct relative prices
o  Banking  sector reform
4. Monitoring  0  Periodic  reporting on key variables
O  External  auditing  of accounts
O  Banking  supervision  and control
Note:  The listed objectives  are exactly  what eventual  privatization  would hope to achieve.
20'Even  diehard  private  sector  supporters  agree  that it would  be romantic  to believe  that growth  in  the Polish  economy  is going
to come  from the new private  sector  and foreign  investors  alone.38
ANNEX  I : Sample  and Data Descrition
The report is based on repeat visits in late August and September 1992  to 75 large
enterprises, which were originally  surveyed  in mid-1991. These firms are from 5 manufacturing
sectors: (a) metallurgy; (b) electromachinery;  (c) chemicals;  (d) light manufacturing  (textiles, leather);
and (e) food processing. The original criterion  for selection  was 1989  sales value as published  in the
LISTA 500 for 1989, the attempt being to select 15 from among the 21 largest firms in each sector.
But obvious giants (the biggest steel mills and shipyards)  were eliminated  as these would dominate  the
statistical  calculations.
The repeat visits of 1992 were made after sharing the first phase findings with the
participating  firms, which ensured a friendly reception. Out of the 75 finms, 73 were successfully  re-
visited (of the remaining,  one was in liquidation  and one under investigation). Eventually,  63 firms
returned the filled-in  questionnaires  in time for this report, and there is good chance that more
responses  can be obtained with additional  follow-up.
The SOEs in question  employ 1500-6000  workers, although  one exceeded  20,000.  A typical
sample firm is not a giant URSUS-type  firm, which gets much media attention, but is no longer
representative  of the state sector.  Annual  sales of the sample firms are in the region of $100 m. or
more.  Products sold by these enterprises  include  pipes, rails, metal sheets, wire, machine  tools,
transformers, electric engines, railway carriages, refrigerators, bicycles;  fertilizer, plastics, organic
and inorganic chemicals; fabrics, clothes, hosiery, shoes and leather goods, meat products, sugar,
processed fruit, chocolate,  cigarettes. Virtually all the firms were SOEs at the start of the ETP, with
powerfil Workers' Councils, two (or more)  trade unions and management  legally subordinate  to the
Workers' Council.  By 1992, almost half had been transformed  into 100%  Treasury-owned  entities
("commercialized")  and 3 were privatized. The enterprises  are located  all over Poland, both in the
big industrial centers (Upper Silesia, Krakow, Warsaw, Wroclaw, Poznan) and smaller cities (South-
East Poland, Szczecin,  Torun, Bydgoszcz,  Radom, Piotrkow  and many  more).
Size indicators  for the sample  firms are summarized  below.  To some extent, the sectoral
classification  is artificial, convenient  for statistical  reporting, but not necessarily  for a study of
adjustment. In this respect, there is sufficient  product and geographical  variance in the sample to
draw interesting  conclusions.
Size Indicators for Sample  Finms
Percentage  3hares (1990)
|  Sector  |  Sales  Employment  Exports
Metallurgy  38.0  41.4  25.9
Electromachinery  9.4  7.8  11.0
Chemical  32.2  30.1  39.8
Light  7.9  8.1  9.1
Food processing  9.1  8.3  2.439
Data DescriDtion: The data set from each enterprise  comprised  statistical  information  for the
period June 1989 - Jun 1992  and answers  to a qualitative  questionnaire  administered  during visits to
firm managers.
The statistical  information  covered: monthly  information  on value of sales, costs of sales,
subsidies, turnover tax, extraordinary  gains and losses, gross profit, tax payments, net profit,
inventories (total and divided into inventorics  of raw materials, work-in-progress  and finished  goods),
cash balances, credit outstanding,  interfirm  credit (payables  and receivables),  dollar deposits,
employment,  wage bill and popiwek norm - a total of 42 variables;  -quarterly information  on total
costs incurred, structure of costs, imports  (not a 'ailable in many firms) - a total of 24 variables;
yearly information  on value of fixed assets, investment  expenditures,  profit distribution, tax
obligations  and tax arrears - a total of 36 variables.
The qualitative  questionnaire  was modified  to focus on the following:  optimism and
expectations  from GOP, including  the credibility  of policy in the third year of the ETP; labor
adjustment  and reactions to the excess wage tax; the enterprise-bank  relationship  and the role of banks
in the transformation  of firms; the social assets problem and potential  solutions;  long-run strategy,
including  sequencing  of restructuring  and privatization. In addition, some questions  from the
previous survey were repeated: price policy, organizational  changes,  and different aspects  of
adjustment  behavior in the firms.40
ANNEX II: Pact On SOEs
Coverage
The Pact applies  to all SOEs and commercialized  enterprises 100% owned by the Treasury,
while some draft laws (e.g., financial  restructuring)  also apply  to companies  where the public sector
ownership  exceeds 50%.  The Pact consists  of draft laws, amendments  to existing  laws and statements
of issues and problems to be addressed.
Objectives
There are two main objectives:
(i) eliminate  uncertainty  facing  enterprises
(ii) involve management  and workers in enterprise  transformation  and reform.
Bill on Financial  Restructuring  of Enterprises  and Banks
This law is essentially  the same as that discussed  in the context of the EFSAL, aiming at
simultaneous  restructuring  of companies  and banks.  The law was discussed  on September 18 in the
Sejm for the first time and no major resistance  was met.
Privatization
Firms embraced  by the Mass Privatization  Program will be excluded  from the purview of this
law.  So will the fuels/energy  and arms sectors, and Railways  and Post and Telegraphs.
Firms which are solvent can choose one of the following  options:
(i) sale to big investor
(ii) public sale of shares
(iii) transfer of controlling  stake to a bank or pension  fund 2"'
(iv) buy-out by management  or employees.
Insolvent  firms can also choose the method  of privatization,  but must produce a draft of an
arrangement  with creditors (under Arrangement  with Creditors Act of 1934, the Civil Code or the
above-mentioned  bill on enterprise restructuring)  and a plan for enterprise  rehabilitation. If
arrangement  with creditors is not sought or reached, bankruptcy  will be declared.
21Not clear whether this refers to debt/equity conversions.41
PPWW  Reform
This is billed as the most important  element  of the Pact alongside  privatization. The aims are
to develop a system of wage growth negotiation  and eliminate  the dividend tax.  Salient features:
(i) a National Negotiation  Commission  consisting  of representative  of the Government,
employees  and workers will determine  norm wage indices  every quarter.
(ii) wages can be paid from profits as well, provided  a specified  portion is set aside for
enterprise  development  and if an amount  equal to profits paid as wages is paid to the
Treasury.ZU
(iii) dividend  will be cancelled.
Starting from January 1, 1993, wage increases  free of PPWW can be paid provided (a) the
ratio of profit to wages booked  as costs is maintained;  (b) tax payments  are timely; and (c) following
management-trade  union negotiations,  enterprises  form a wage payments  strategy  which is agreed with
local tax chambers, including  possible relief and exemption.
Other Main Aspects of Pact
In addition the Pact discusses  softening  of leasing terms of SOE assets, clarification  of land
property rights and the need to formulate  solutions  to unwanted  assets and the burden of enterprise-
owned worker housing. Further, there are proposals  to amend sections  of the Labor Code relating  to
collective  bargaining  and health and safety at work.
2 2Atdiougb  it is not  specificd, pmfits presumably  refers  to 'profits  after corporate  income  taxes". Essentially,  bonuses  will
be taxed  at 100%.42
ANNEX m: Recent Modifications  to the Excess Wage Tax (PPWW)
The amnendments  to the PPWW law and dates of effectiveness  are as follows:
(a) De-indexing (Effective October 1, 1992): The Council of Ministers will specify  the percentage
wage norm increase for each month in every quarter before the 15th  of the first month in that quarter.
Thus, indexing  to inflation  is dropped.
(b) Wage Norm Increase With Labor Shedding (Retroactive to January  1, 1992): Those
enterprises  reducing average employment  in 1992  are entitled  to increase the yearly wage norm by
half of the wage norm lost due to the employment  reduction. In practice, this regulation  was also
effective last year bases on an MOF resolution.
(c) Negotiations with tax chambers (Effective  January  1, 1993): Enterprises  are allowed to
negotiate  payment schedules  and allowances  on PPWW  with local tax chambers after presenting
individual  wage policy paths.
(d) Lower tax rates:  The tax schedule  as of January 1, 1993 will be as follows:
Excess over norm  Tax rate
0-3%  100%
3-6%  200%
> 6%  300%.
The above schedule  incorporates  two changes:  first, the maximum  rate kicks in only when the norm is
exceeded  by 6% (upto the end of 1992, the maximum  rate kicks in after a 5% excess); second, the
maximum  rate is lowered  progressively  from 500% in the first 8 months of 1992 to 400% from
September 1, 1992 and to 300% in 1993.
Main proposals included in the "Pact"
There will continue to be a norm for wages  booked as operating  costs ("cost wages"),
exceeding  which will be taxed as shown above. The "Pact" proposal is to abolish  the dividend  and
PPWW paid on bonuses exceeding  the norm for bonuses. Instead,  profits after income tax and
PPWW on cost wages will be equally shared among  investment  purposes  and the rest could be split
between bonuses  and payments  to the budget. Effectively,  the tax rate on bonuses ("wages  paid out
of profits") will be 100%.
Comment:  Wage Maximization  Under Pact Proposal
Given an income tax rate of 40% and the above  schedule  for PPWW on cost wages, what
would a wage maximizing  strategy look like under the sharing proposal of the Pact?
Let P =  profits before wages and taxes; We = the norm for cost wages; A = cost wages;
and W be total wage payments  (cost wages plus bonus). Under the pact sharing  proposal, W is:43
W = A + (1/3)[P - A - t(P-A) - ir(A-W*)S],  where
t is the income tax rate = 40%, X is the relevant marginal  PPWW rate and S =  1 if the wage norm
is exceeded  and 0 otherwise.
The relevant derivative  when choosing  A to maximize  W is:
dW/dA  =  1 +  (1/3)(-1 +  t-  r).
Since t=40%,  the above  derivative is positive so long as the marginal  PPWW rate is less than 240%.
Given the above schedule of taxation,  cost wages will therefore be a little less than 6% above the
norm, as this will mean a marginal PPWW  rate of only 200%.
The scheme is complex  and could lead to surprises. The provision for negotiation  with local
tax offices is likely to lead to ad hocism  and possible corruption.Pollcy  Research Working Paper Series
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